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The Constitution provides that “all legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”1 From this
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
*
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language, the United States Supreme Court derived the “nondelegation
doctrine,” which dictates that “Congress may not constitutionally
delegate its legislative power to another branch of government.”2
In theory, the nondelegation doctrine precludes Congress from
delegating its lawmaking power to administrative agencies. But,
proving a nondelegation violation is an uphill battle. The common
understanding of our jurisprudence is that striking down regulations
by administrative agencies as violating the nondelegation doctrine is a
rarity.3
The Supreme Court has stated that “Congress does not violate the
Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain
degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors;”4 instead, Congress
must simply “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle” to
which the agency must conform.5 If this is done, a court will find the
delegation of broad authority to the agency to be constitutional.
There is, however, an open issue regarding whether the same
“intelligible principle” standard applies to delegations of authority that
allow for the promulgation of both civil and criminal penalties. In Touby
v. United States,6 the Supreme Court was asked whether “something
more than an ‘intelligible principle’ is required” when Congress
authorizes an agency to issue regulations that contemplate criminal
sanctions.7 The plaintiffs in that case argued that regulations of this sort
“pose a heightened risk to individual liberty” and therefore require
Congress to provide specific guidance, not just an intelligible principle,
in its delegations.8 The Court admitted that its “cases are not entirely
clear as to whether more specific guidance is needed.”9 However, the
Court decided to resolve the issue another day.10 It remains an open
question whether Congress must provide “more specific guidance”
to administrative agencies that promulgate regulations authorizing
criminal penalties.11
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164–65 (1991) (noting that “‘[t]he nondelegation
doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of
Government.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989)).
3
See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down New Deal legislation
establishing restrictions on “hot oil” under the nondelegation doctrine); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down New Deal industrial codes under the
nondelegation doctrine).
4
Touby, 500 U.S. at 165.
5
J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
6
500 U.S. 160.
7
Id. at 165–66.
8
Id. at 166.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See, e.g., United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 255 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
2
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On July 27, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA).12 Enacted
as Title I of the AWA, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act (SORNA)13 requires convicted sex offenders to register in each
jurisdiction in which they reside, are employed, are a student, and were
convicted.14 If a sex offender fails to register when required to do so by
SORNA and then travels in interstate commerce, the individual faces up
to ten years imprisonment.15 For offenders who were convicted prior to
the effective date of SORNA and were therefore unable to comply with
the initial registration requirements of the Act, Congress, in § 16913(d)
of SORNA, delegated authority to the United States Attorney General
to specify the applicability of the registration requirements.16
On February 28, 2007, the Attorney General published an Interim
Rule,17 which provides that the registration requirements of SORNA
apply to all sex offenders who have been convicted of an offense which
would require registration, even if the conviction for the sex offense
was prior to the enactment of SORNA.18 Many defendants—convicted
sex offenders—throughout the country have argued that delegating
authority to the Attorney General under SORNA to decide the
applicability of registration requirements violates the nondelegation
doctrine.19
Almost every court confronted with this issue has held that
Congress’s delegation to the Attorney General does not violate the
Supreme Court has expressly refrained from deciding whether Congress must provide “more
specific guidance,” rather than merely an “intelligible principle,” when authorizing the executive
branch to promulgate regulations contemplating criminal sanctions); United States v. AnvariHamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829 (N.D. Ohio. 2005) (acknowledging that while the Supreme
Court has upheld Congress’s delegation of civil authority to the President under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, the Court has not addressed the issue of delegation of authority
to define criminal conduct, which is “more complex”).
12
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified in
scattered section of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
13
42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2006).
14
Id. § 16913(a).
15
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
16
42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (vesting the Attorney General with “the authority to specify the
applicability of the [registration] requirements” to sex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006,
the date of enactment, “and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with”
the initial registration requirement in subsection (b)).
17
28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007).
18
Id.
19
See, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 784 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (W.D. Va. 2011) (rejecting argument
by defendant that Congress impermissibly delegated exclusive legislative authority to the
Attorney General to determine SORNA’s retroactive application); United States v. Hann, 574 F.
Supp. 2d 827, 837 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (holding that the delegation of power in SORNA does not
give the Attorney General the power to legislate and therefore does not violate the nondelegation
doctrine).
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nondelegation doctrine, although each of these cases was decided
under the “intelligible principle” standard.20 An undecided question
is: if a court were to adopt the “more specific guidance” standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Touby when Congress delegates
authority to executive agencies to issue regulations that contemplate
criminal sanctions,21 would the delegation by Congress in SORNA to
the Attorney General pass muster?
If the “more specific guidance” standard were applied, then it is
likely that Congress would be found to have impermissibly delegated
legislative power to the Attorney General. Recently, in Reynolds v.
United States,22 Justice Antonin Scalia hinted at this outcome,23 noting
that the delegation in § 16913(d) “sail[s] close to the wind.” In addition,
at least one court has discussed this exact issue:24 a federal magistrate
judge, writing a Report and Recommendation, wrote:
[I]f such “specific guidance” is required when the
executive engages in rule making in the criminal context,
I would recommend that this indictment be dismissed
on the ground that SORNA does not provide sufficient
“specific guidance” so as to allow this delegation of rule
making authority to the Attorney General.25
This Comment argues that courts should adopt the “specific
guidance” rule for delegations relating to criminal penalties, due to
the fact these delegated decisions pose a heightened risk to individual
liberties. If such a standard were adopted, Congress’s delegation of
power to the Attorney General in SORNA would likely be found to
violate the nondelegation doctrine. Part II of this Comment explains the
history and development of the nondelegation doctrine. Part III provides
a background of the AWA and SORNA and explores the history of the
2007 interim rule issued by the Attorney General. Part IV examines
decisions that address whether Congress’s delegation of rulemaking
See, e.g., United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that SORNA’s
statement of purpose is a guiding and sufficient intelligible principle); United States v. Ambert,
561 F.3d 1202, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding SORNA’s broad policy goals to be intelligible
principles); Sherman, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (“Here, Congress clearly delineated the public safety
and efficiency arguments underling SORNA’s enactment, and . . . that guidance meets the
intelligible principle test.”); United States v. Morris, No. 08-0142, 2008 WL 5249231, at *10 (W.D.
La. Nov. 14, 2008) (finding that the delegation made by § 16913(d) of SORNA to be constitutional
under the “intelligible principle” standard but noting that prior cases had left open the question of
whether § 16913(d) would pass muster under the “more specific guidance” standard).
21
See Touby, 500 U.S. at 166.
22
132 S. Ct. 975 (2012).
23
Id. at 986 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24
United States v. Morris, No. 08-0142, 2008 WL 5249231 (W.D. La. Nov. 14, 2008).
25
Id. at *10.
20
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authority to the Attorney General in SORNA passes constitutional
muster under the nondelegation doctrine. Part V discusses other
scenarios in which the “specific guidance,” rather than “intelligible
principle” standard, might be invoked. Finally, Part VI argues that the
“specific guidance” standard should apply in the SORNA context and,
by reason of this application, Congress unconstitutionally delegated
authority to the Attorney General, in § 16913(d) of SORNA.
I. The Doctrine of Nondelegability
The United States government is rooted by the constitutional
principles of separation of powers and due process.26 In order to keep
Congress’s legislative power separate from the executive and judicial
branches, the Constitution limits congressional delegation of legislative
power to the other branches of government. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized this principle as the nondelegation doctrine.27
Specifically, while the Supreme Court has explicitly declared that
“the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated,”28 it has held
that Congress can delegate “powers which [it] may rightfully exercise
itself.”29 One policy justification permitting such delegations is that “in
our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability
to delegate power under broad general directives.”30
Judicial writings of some of the Justices31 reflect the flourish of
concerns in scholarly literature regarding the scope of the delegation
doctrine.32 Still, the Court “has deemed it ‘constitutionally sufficient if
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371, 412 (1989) (concluding that Congress did not
violate the separation of powers principle when it constitutionally delegated to the United States
Sentencing Commission the power to determine appropriate sentences, within the statutorily
established range, for federal criminal offenses); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 374 (1971)
(calling the right to due process a “fundamental value in our American constitutional system”).
27
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371; see also David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My
Critics, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 731, 735–44 (1999) (explaining the rationales behind the nondelegation
doctrine).
28
United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
29
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41 (1825).
30
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372; see also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398
(1940) (noting that congressional delegation is necessary to ensure that the exertion of legislative
power does not become useless).
31
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Indus.
Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
32
See e.g., David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People
Through Delegation (1993); Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate
To Be Constitutional, 53 Fed. Comm. L.J. 427 (2001) (calling for congressional amendment of the
public interest standard, because of a conflict with nondelegation values) Theodore J. Lowi, Two
Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 295, 296
26
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Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which
is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.’”33 That
said, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that discerning the exact limits
is challenging and noted that “the precise boundary of this power is a
subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a court will not enter
unnecessarily.”34 But some limits need to be drawn so as to preserve the
Constitution’s separation of powers principles.35
A. History and Application of the Nondelegation Doctrine
In its simplest terms, the nondelegation doctrine provides that
any statute through which Congress delegates its legislative power is
unconstitutional.36 In several early cases, the Court upheld delegations
when it reasoned that Congress made the legislated decisions and
the executive or administrative official was (1) acting pursuant to
Congress’s instructions when it found contingent facts or conditions
that triggered implementing a certain statute or (2) merely filling in the
statute’s details. The first ground is manifested in The Brig Aurora,37in
which the Court upheld a congressional delegation of authority to
the President to lift a statutory trade embargo against France and
England should he determine that they had stopped interfering with

(1987) (arguing that broad delegation “deranges” virtually all constitutional relationships); Peter
H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 5 (1982) (analyzing “certain causes and consequences” of Congress delegating legislative
power to the executive branch); see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1237–41 (1994) (contrasting the “true constitutional rule of nondelegation”
with the “post-New Deal positive law”).
33
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
34
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). See generally 1 K. Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise Ch. 3 (2d ed. 1978); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action Ch. 2
(1965).
35
See generally Viktoria Loveit, Revealing the True Definition of APA § 701(a)(2) by Reconciling “No
Law to Apply” with the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047, 1057 (2006) (noting that broad
delegations that do not precisely prescribe agency action lead agencies to make their own rules
and determination and in effect arguably engage in legislative lawmaking, which is Congress
job.); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions—A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 492–93 (1987) (“These agencies adopt rules having
the shape and impact of statutes, mold governmental policy through enforcement decisions and
other initiatives, and decide cases in ways that determine the rights of private parties.”).
36
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The focus of controversy, in the long line of our
so-called excessive delegation cases, has been whether the degree of generality contained in the
authorization for exercise of executive or judicial powers in a particular field is so unacceptably
high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers. I say ‘so-called excessive delegation’
because although that convenient terminology is often used, what is really at issue is whether there
has been any delegation of legislative power, which occurs (rarely) when Congress authorizes the
exercise of executive or judicial power without adequate standards. Strictly speaking, there is no
acceptable delegation of legislative power.”).
37
7 Cr. (11 U.S.) 382 (1813).
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U.S. trade.38 In response to the objection that Congress had invalidly
delegated legislative power, the Court simply answered that Congress
may exercise its power conditionally. Analogously, in Field v. Clark,39
the Court again held that Congress has the ability to delegate its powers
to the Executive,40 but noted a limit: “[t]he legislature cannot delegate
its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action depend.”41 Finally, the second ground
is exemplified in Wayman v. Southhard,42 wherein the Court approved a
delegation of power to the federal courts to establish rules of practice.
The Supreme Court has rejected delegation challenges in all but
the most extreme cases,43 and has accepted delegations of vast powers
to administrative agencies.44 Specifically, during the mid-1930s, two
significant instances in which the Court found an unconstitutional
delegation to another governmental agency involved grants of
discretion to administrators that the Court found to be limitless.
First, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,45 the Court found that
Congress unconstitutionally granted legislative power to the President
by authorizing him to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce
of “hot oil” without providing substantive or procedural standards to
govern his decision.46 The statute was silent with regard to when and
under what circumstances the President should invoke his power,47
and the Court found that Congress had “declared no policy, ha[d]
established no standard, [and] ha[d] laid down no [intelligible] rule.”
Second, in A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,48 the Court
again held that Congress unconstitutionally distributed its vested
legislative functions.49 In Schechter, the Court struck down certain
statutory provisions of a “Live Poultry Code” (Code), which the
President had approved under section three of the National Industry
Id. at 388–389.
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
40
Id. at 694 (upholding delegation of authority to the President to equalize duties on imports).
41
Id. (citing Locke’s Appeal v. Locke, 72 Pa. 491, 498 (1873)).
42
10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1 (1825).
43
See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
44
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding the inability of the courts to
police delegations).
45
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
46
Id. at 415.
47
See id. at 430.
48
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
49
Id. at 529.
38
39
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Act.50 The Court found that the pertinent statutory phrase, authorizing
the President to approve “codes of fair competition,” was ambiguous51
and did not constitute an intelligible principle necessary to restrict the
President’s action in enforcing the statute. Lacking such a principle,
Congress essentially afforded the President “unfettered discretion”52 to
create “new laws”53 without congressional approval.
In J.W. Hampton,54 the Court introduced the “intelligible principle”
test, in a bold 1928 decision, when it upheld congressional delegation
to the President of the authority to alter tariffs when he found that they
did not equalize production costs in the United States and competing
foreign countries.55 In Hampton, the Court attempted to create a
general standard for distinguishing permissible from impermissible
delegations when it stated that in seeking cooperation from another
branch, Congress was restrained only according to “common sense
and the inherent necessities” of the situation.56 The Court somewhat
clarified this vague statement when it stated that the Court would
sustain delegations whenever Congress provided an “intelligible
principle” to which the President or an agency must conform.57 This
“intelligible principle” test articulated in J.W. Hampton is the same as
the “legislative standards” test of Schechter 58 and Panama Refining Co.59
B. The “Intelligible Principle” as the Standard for a
Constitutional Delegation of Legislative Power
In the 1940’s, the Supreme Court leniently applied the nondelegation
doctrine; today, the Court sustains delegations whenever Congress
provides an “intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform
and applies broad standards to find this vague standard satisfied. 60
Thus, the “intelligible principle” standard represents the baseline that
Id. at 550–51.
Id. at 531–35.
52
Id. at 537, 542.
53
Id. at 537.
54
276 U.S. 394 (1928).
55
Id. at 408–09.
56
Id. at 406.
57
Id. at 409.
58
295 U.S. at 530.
59
293 U.S. at 421.
60
See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (stating that when Congress “lay[s]
down by legislative act an intelligible principle,” a specific formula is not necessary so long as an
agency interprets the act by considering the act’s purpose within statutory context) (quoting J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 426 (1944) (stating
that the standards of the Emergency Price Control Act are sufficiently definite and precise to be
a constitutional delegation of legislative power); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 600–01 (1944) (stating the “just and reasonable” standard of the Natural Gas Act was
a constitutional delegation of legislative power despite the act’s failure to express a specific rule).
50
51
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Congress must establish when delegating legislative power.
But, as Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas stated in Whitman
v. American Trucking Ass’ns,61 the Court should abandon the “intelligible
principle” test in cases in which “the significance of the delegated
decision is simply too great” to be exercised by any governmental
organ but Congress.62 And, in the words of one district judge,
A jurisprudence which allows Congress to impliedly
delegate its criminal lawmaking authority to a regulatory
agency such as [the Department of Justice]—so long as
Congress provides an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide
that agency—is enough to make any judge pause and
question what has happened. Deferent and minimal
judicial review of Congress’ transfer of its criminal
lawmaking function to other bodies, in other branches,
calls into question the vitality of the tripartite system
established by our Constitution.63
Although Congress must normally give some guidance that indicates
broad policy objectives, there is no general prohibition on delegating
authority that includes the exercise of policy judgment.64 A number
of cases illustrate the point.65 Likewise, even in regulatory schemes
that affect the entire economy, the Court has “never demanded . . .
that statutes provide a ‘determinate criterion’ for saying ‘how much
[of the regulated harm] is too much.’”66 Hence, Congress may confer
discretion on administrative agencies to make determinations like how
“imminent” is too imminent, how “necessary” is necessary enough,
or how “hazardous” is too hazardous on administrative agencies.67
In sum, the Court does not insist on much regarding congressional
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
Id. at 487.
63
United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1555 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
64
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 378 (approving congressional delegations to the Sentencing Commission
to advance and promulgate guidelines but admitting that significant discretion existed with
respect to making policy judgment about the relative severity of different crimes and the relative
weight of the characteristics of offender that are to be considered). Notably, in Mistretta, the Court
found the statute provided more than an intelligible principle because it “‘outline[d] the policies
which prompted establishment of the Commission, explain[ed] what the Commission should do
and how it should do it, and set[] out specific directives to govern particular situations.’” Id. at
378–79 (quoting United States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. La. 1988)).
65
The Court has upheld complex industrial economic regulation where the agencies had initially
denied possession of such power, unsuccessfully sought authorization from Congress, and acted
without the requested congressional guidance. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.
747 (1968); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
66
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. U.S.
E.P.A., 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1999)).
67
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475–76 (quoting Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165–67 (1991)).
61
62

304

Passing the Torch But Sailing Too Close to the Wind

standards when Congress employs a delegation.
II. The Adam Walsh Act, SORNA, and The 2007
Interim Rule Issued By The Attorney General
“Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation,” partly because
“the victims of sexual assault are most often juveniles” and because
“convicted sex offenders . . . are much more likely than any other type
of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.”68 As a
result, Congress has, over the years, enacted legislation to help states
monitor sex offenders and disseminate pertinent information about
them to the public “for its own safety.”69
A. Precursors to the AWA and SORNA
For example, President Clinton enacted the first federal offender
registration law, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act of 1994 (Wetterling
Act),70 which established minimum standards for states to register
sex offenders and conditioned states’ receiving federal funding on
adopting those minimum standards.71 Addressing a hole in the criminal
justice system—the lack of community awareness of the presence of
a convicted sex offender—Congress amended the Wetterling Act,
in 1996, to include a provision for community notification,72 known
as “Megan’s Law.”73 Congress also enacted the Pam Lychner Sexual
Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 (Lychner Act), which
demanded that a national sex offender database be created, required
lifetime registration for certain offenders, and criminalized some
persons’ failure to register a federal offense and thus subjecting them
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32–33 (2002) (plurality opinion); see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103
(2003) (acknowledging that “grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex
offenders” exist).
69
Smith, 538 U.S. at 99 (2003).
70
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act,
Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038, 2042 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006))
(stating that the Attorney General shall establish guidelines for state programs).
71
Jamie Markham, Petitions to Terminate Sex Offender Registration, UNC School of Gov’t Blog (May
14, 2009, 9:30 AM), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=355; Smith, 538 U.S. 84 at 89–90.
72
See 42 U.S.C. § 14701(e)(2) (2006) (“The State or any agency authorized by the State shall release
relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required
to register under this section . . . .”).
73
Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071(d) (2006)) (authorizing community notification when sex offenders are released into a
particular neighborhood and affording states the power to determine what kind and how much
of the information is disclosed to whom and for what purpose). See generally Wayne A. Logan,
Knowledge As Power: A History of Criminal Registration Laws in America (Stanford Univ.
Press 2008) (surveying local and state registration laws and discussing how the sexual abuse
and murder of Megan Kanka by a convicted sex offender triggered national interest in state
legislation—such legislation became known as “Megan’s Law”).
68
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to penalties.74 In 1997, Congress expanded the Lychner Act’s federal
criminal penalty for failure to register to include individuals, including
military sex offenders, who had been convicted of federal sex offenses.75
B. Enactment of the AWA and SORNA
Despite various amendments to the Wetterling Act, an estimated
100,000 out of 500,000 offenders remained “unregistered and their
locations unknown to the public and law enforcement.”76 Also, “there
[remained] a 200,000 person difference between all of the state registries
and the federal National Sex Offender Registry.”77 Thus, more than ten
years after the Wetterling Act was enacted and the ensuing assortment
of state registration and notification legislation, Congress passed the
AWA, which included SORNA.78
SORNA was enacted “to protect the public from sex offenders
and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks
by violent predators.”79 The legislation stemmed from concerns that
variations in state legislation were creating loopholes, enabling tens of
thousands of sex offenders to exploit such deficiencies and avoid having
to register if they moved between states.80 Hence, in passing SORNA,
Congress sought, in part, to make “more uniform and effective” the
“patchwork” of federal and state sex-offender registration systems that
were already in effect.81
In general, SORNA includes both civil and criminal aspects:
it requires the creation of a national sex offender registry,82 makes
Pub. L. No. 104-236, § 2, 110 Stat. 3093 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2006));
see also Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2238–39 (2010).
75
The Dep’t. of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1998, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071(b)(7), 14072(i) (Supp. III 1997)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i)(3)–(4)
(2006).
76
152 Cong. Rec. H5722 (2006).
77
Id. at H5726.
78
42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq.
79
42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
80
152 Cong. Rec. S8012, 8013 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 152 Cong. Rec.
H5705, 5722 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). See generally Rebecca
L. Visgaitis, Retroactive Application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: A Modern
Encroachment on Judicial Power, 45 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 273, 281 (2011) (noting that these
concerns inspired SORNA).
81
Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 978 (2012); see also id. (explaining that SORNA contains
a comprehensive revision of the national standards for sex offender registration and notification
and creates a new federal crime allowing for the prosecution of individuals who fail to register
as required by SORNA) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(10), 16913–16916 (2006 and
Supp. III), 16925)).
82
42 U.S.C. § 16912(a) (2006); see Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 978–79 (noting that, generally, SORNA
requires “those convicted of certain sex crimes to provide state governments with (and to update)
information, such as names and current addresses” to ensure strong state and federal sex offender
74
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registration of qualifying offenders mandatory,83 and establishes a
new federal crime for individuals who are required to register under
§ 16913 but knowingly fail to do so.84
1. Specific SORNA Requirements
The legislation creates three tiers of offenders, categorized based
on the gravity of the underlying sex offense.85 Specifically, SORNA’s
registration requirements are set forth in §16913.86 Sex offenders must
register and keep their registrations current in each jurisdiction where
they live, work, and are a student.”87 In turn, a “sex offender” is defined
as “an individual who was convicted of” an offense that falls within
the statute’s articulated offenses.88 Separate provisions within SORNA
delineate the information that must be collected as part of registration,
the length of time that offenders must remain registered, and the
frequency with which a sex offender must appear in person and verify
the registry information.89
2. Criminal Penalties Under SORNA
SORNA makes it a federal crime to fail to register.90 A person who
(1) “is required to register under [SORNA],” (2) “travels in interstate
or foreign commerce” and (3) “knowingly fails to register or update
a registration as required by [SORNA]” is guilty of a federal crime
punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment for up to ten years.91 The
law does not require that the penalty imposed for failing to register
be proportional to that imposed for the original crime.92 In fact, the
penalty clause of § 2250(a) “can be an order of magnitude greater than
the maximum allowable for the offender’s original offense.”93
registries); see also 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (imposing registration requirement).
83
42 U.S.C. § 16911. The distinguishing categories relate to the duration that sex offenders
must remain registered and the number of times they must make in-person verifications. See id.
§§ 16915–16916.
84
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (making failing to register as required under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 a
federal sex offense).
85
See 42 U.S.C. § 16911. The distinguishing categories relate to how long a sex offender is required
to remain registered.
86
Id. § 16913.
87
Id. § 16913(a).
88
Id. § 16911. SORNA provides a broad definition of “sex offender.” See e.g., id. § 16911(5)(A)(i)
(stating that a sex offender is an individual convicted of “a criminal offense that has an element
involving a sexual act of sexual contact with another”).
89
Id. §§ 16914–16916; see also id. § 16925.
90
See 18 U.S.C. § 2250.
91
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
92
See 42 U.S.C. § 16913.
93
Corey R. Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the Others: Why The Federal Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 Harv. J. On Legis. 369, 380 (2009).
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3. Delegation to the Attorney General
Additionally, § 16913(d) of SORNA instructs that “[t]he Attorney
General shall have the authority to specify the applicability the
[registration] requirements” to pre-Act offenders.94 The Supreme
Court established that sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s July
2006 enactment were not required to register under SORNA until the
Attorney General exercised his delegated authority to “validly specif[y]
that the Act’s registration provisions apply to them.”95 Impliedly, a preSORNA sex offender cannot be criminally prosecuted under § 2250(a)
until he is under a legal obligation to register, and, in turn, that
initial registration is not a legal obligation until the Attorney General
affirmatively promulgates rules declaring SORNA’s provisions apply
to that individual.
On February 28, 2007, the Attorney General issued an interim rule
extending SORNA’s application “to all sex offenders, including sex
offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior
to the enactment of [§ 16913].”96 The Interim Rule was made effective
immediately to safeguard against most pre-Act sex offenders evading
SORNA’s registration requirements and enforcement mechanisms.97
III. Specific Guidance or Uniform
Intelligible Principle Standard?
Many sex offenders convicted prior to the enactment of SORNA,
whose duty to register came from the Attorney General’s regulation
rather than the statute itself, challenged the constitutionality of
SORNA and the legality of the Interim Rule.98 Almost every court to
42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).
Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 980 (2012).
96
28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007). The courts of appeals are divided on exactly when SORNA’s registration
requirements became applicable to pre-enactment sex offenders. See, e.g., United States v. Mattix,
No. 12-30013, 2012 WL 4076148, at *2–3 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2012) (holding SORNA applicable to
pre-enactment sex offenders as of August 1, 2008); United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 561–62
(6th Cir. 2012) (same), cert. denied, No. 11-10520 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012); United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d
578, 586 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding SORNA applicable to pre-enactment sex offenders on February
28, 2007), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010).
97
72 Fed. Reg. at 8896–97.
98
In United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2008), abrogated in part by Reynolds, 132 S.
Ct. 975, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that defendants who were
required to register under state law prior to SORNA’s enactment lacked standing to challenge
SORNA’s applicability to pre-Act offenders. See also, e.g., United States v. Mefford, 417 F. App’x
586, 587 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have held that sex offenders who were required to register before
SORNA’s passage . . . are unaffected by the Attorney General’s expanded authority.”), vacated and
cert. granted, No. 11-6241, 2012 WL 538290 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012). The Eighth Circuit joined four other
Courts of Appeals that essentially held that SORNA’s requirements “apply from the date of the
Act’s enactment” to pre-Act offenders who were required to register under state law. Reynolds,
132 S. Ct. at 980. Six other Courts of Appeals, however, determined that SORNA’s “registration
94
95
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reach the issue held that Congress did not impermissibly delegate the
authority to the Attorney General to specify the applicability of the
registration requirements to pre-SORNA offenders and prescribe rules
for registration of those offenders unable to comply with statutory
requirements.99 Yet, most of those cases were decided under the
“intelligible principle” standard and in light of “[t]he Supreme Court
[giving] Congress wide latitude in meeting the intelligible principle
requirement.”100 As such, the question remains whether the delegation
in SORNA would pass muster under the “more specific guidance”
standard. Thus, it must be decided whether an “intelligible principle”
or “more specific guidance” should be the test applied by courts
reviewing a delegation by Congress that provides for promulgation of
criminal sanctions.
A. Reynolds v. United States
An emblem of the consequences of applying the ambiguous
“intelligible principle” as the standard for a constitutional delegation
of legislative power, a deep circuit split101 emerged concerning whether
SORNA’s “registration requirements apply to pre-Act offenders prior
to the time that the Attorney General specifies their applicability, i.e.,
from July 2006 until at least February 2007.”102 Reversing the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and addressing the circuit
split, the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States103 held that: (1)
SORNA does not require pre-Act offenders to register before the
Attorney General validly specifies that the Act’s registration provisions
apply to them and, as a result, (2) pre-Act offenders have standing to
challenge SORNA under the nondelegation doctrine.104
requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders unless and until the Attorney General so
specifies.” Id.
99
42 U.S.C. § 16913(d); see e.g., United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1214 (11th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the Congress guided the Attorney General in his exercise of discretion by setting
forth “the broad policy goal of protecting the public” and seeking a comprehensive national
registry); accord United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir. 2009); Sherman, 784 F. Supp.
2d 618, 622 (W.D. Va. 2011) (“Here, Congress clearly delineated the public safety and efficiency
arguments underling SORNA’s enactment, and as every court to consider this argument has
found, that guidance meets the intelligible principle test.”).
100
South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2005).
101
Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980 (highlighting that five other circuits, similar to the Third Circuit,
had held that the registration requirements apply from the date of the Act’s enactment, while six
circuits had held that the Act’s registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders unless
and until the Attorney General so specifies).
102
Id.
103
132 S. Ct. 975.
104
Id. at 984 (noting that since the SORNA’s registration requirements become applicable to
pre-SORNA offenders only after the Attorney General issued the Interim Rule, its validity
consequently matters).
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In Reynolds, the defendant, who had been convicted of a Missouri sex
offense before SORNA’s enactment, sought to dismiss his indictment
for failing to register and update a registration in violation of section
2250(a).105 Essentially, he constructed the following argument: because
SORNA’s registration requirements were not applicable to individuals
with pre-Act convictions, the Interim Rule made SORNA’s registration
requirements applicable to him, thus giving him standing to contest the
Rule’s validity.106 By way of procedural background, while the district
court rejected the defendant’s improper delegation argument on the
merits, the Third Circuit held that SORNA applied to pre-Act offenders
“even in the absence of a rule by the Attorney General” and as a result,
it did not address the Interim Rule’s validity.
Thus, the Court was confronted with two potential issues: first,
whether SORNA required pre-Act offenders to register as soon as it
was enacted in 2006 and before the Attorney General specified that the
statute’s provisions apply to them and second, whether pre-SORNA
offenders have standing to contest the validity of the Interim Rule
as violating both the nondelegation doctrine and the Administrative
Procedure Act.107
Because SORNA is ambiguous as to whether it, in and of itself,
applies to pre-Act offenders, the Court invoked statutory analysis
and discussed policy considerations to reach its first holding. Justice
Stephen Breyer, writing for the court, noted that SORNA’s text consists
of four statements: the first statement requires a sex offender to register
and update his registration information; the second further states that
this initial registration should occur before completing a “sentence of
imprisonment” for a sex offense; the third mandates that a sex offender
update his registration within three business days upon changing his
“name, residence, employment, or student status”; and, finally, the
fourth vests the Attorney General with the “authority to specify the
applicability of the requirements” to sex offenders convicted before
SORNA was enacted.108
From the legislation’s plain language, the Court reasoned that the “[f]
ourth statement modifies the [f]irst” because it specifically deals “with
a subset (pre-Act offenders) of the [f]irst [s]tatement’s broad general
class (all sex offenders)”and therefore controls SORNA’s application to
that subset. Supporting its interpretation, the Court stated that because
Id. at 976.
Id. at 979–980.
107
Id. at 980 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B), (d)(3) (2006)).
108
Id. at 980–81.
105
106
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the fourth statement gives the Attorney General the “authority to
specify the Act’s ‘applicability,’ not its ‘nonapplicability,’”109 it confers
the “authority to apply the Act, not the authority to make exceptions.”110
Hence for individuals whose convictions arose before SORNA’s
enactment, Congress authorized, but did not direct or require, that the
Attorney General prescribe regulations for their registration. Moreover,
the Court speculated that Congress intended to leave it up to the
Attorney General to decide § 16913’s applicability to resolve practical
problems: it might “not prove feasible” to immediately require newly
registering or re-registering of a large number of pre-SORNA offenders
since that may prove costly.111 The majority’s view that the language
means that the Attorney General has to say when and whether the law
applies to pre-SORNA offenders112 supports the inference that Congress
bestowed a police agency with the power to control the manner and
method of SORNA’s implementation and substantively determine the
scope of SORNA’s reach.113
Justice Antonin Scalia penned a lengthy dissent in which he attacked
the majority’s decision, arguing that “it is simply implausible” that
Congress would delegate such overreaching discretion by “leaving it
up” to the Attorney General to determine “whether the registration
would ever apply to pre-Act offenders.”114 He wrote:
[I]t is not entirely clear to me that Congress can
constitutionally leave it to the Attorney General
to decide—with no statutory standard whatever
governing his discretion—whether a criminal statute
will or will not apply to certain individuals. That
seems to me sailing close to the wind with regard to
the principle that legislative powers are nondelegable,
and “[i]t is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation
of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues
if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no
Compare id. at 981(majority opinion), with id. at 986 (Scalia and Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting).
Id. at 981. But see United States v. Morris, No. 08-0142, 2008 WL 5249231 at *8 (W.D. La. Nov.
14, 2008) (“It would be illogical for members of Congress to express the concern that thousands
of sex offenders who were required to register under state law were evading those registration
requirements and then exempt those same offenders from SORNA.”).
111
Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 981.
112
Id.
113
Cf. United States v. Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d 923, 928 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that the delegation
to the Attorney General did not allow him to decide if SORNA would have retroactive application,
in violation of the nondelegation doctrine; rather, the statutory language was indicative of a
gap-filling provision to ensure SORNA’s clearly articulated purpose was effectuated when sex
offenders fell outside the purview of the statutory language).
114
Reynolds, 132 S. Ct at 986.
109
110
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constitutional question.” 115
As support for his argument, Justice Scalia also questioned the
point at which a poorly drafted statute becomes unworkable and
underscored that “[i]ntelligently drafted statutes make mandatory
those executive acts essential to their functioning, whether or not those
acts would likely occur anyway.”116
B. Cases Discussing the SORNA Delegation Post-Reynolds
Cases discussing the Attorney General’s power to impose criminal
sanctions illustrate that there is a difference between delegating the
power to set policy and the authority to exercise discretion in carrying
out the policy. The Supreme Court has confessed that its prior cases were
not clear as to whether or not regulations, which relate to the imposition
of criminal sanctions and pose a “heightened risk to individual liberty”
require Congress to provide the executive department with specific
guidance.117 However, it is undisputed that some essence of the power
to define crimes and fix a range of punishments is not delegable.
In United States v. Morris,118 a federal magistrate judge, writing a
Report and Recommendation, discussed the exact issue addressed
by Justice Scalia in Reynolds v. United States. In Morris, the court held
that Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate its legislative power
because there was a clear “guiding principle” enunciated by Congress,
and nothing more, “at least for now,” was clearly required by law.119
Thus, the court did not necessarily reject defendant’s argument that
Congress was required to give more specific guidance when it let the
chief law enforcement officer of the United States decide to whom
the law applies.120 Instead, it acknowledged that there may be certain
“core” functions that must be reviewed under a stricter standard than
the intelligible principle standard when they are delegated.121 The
Compare id. at 986 (internal citations omitted) (Scalia, J., dissenting), with Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank
of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409, 410 (1873) (establishing the timeless principle that penal statutes are to
be strictly construed, and that no one should be “subjected to a penalty unless the words of the
statute plainly impose it”); M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 621 (1946) (highlighting
that that timeless principle requires that prohibited acts be clearly defined in the rule); Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (“There is no absolute rule . . . against Congress’ delegation
of authority to define criminal punishments.”).
116
Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 986. This suggests Congress’s delegation to the Attorney General was
broad and ambiguous and thus required the Attorney General to make legislative decisions,
which raises an issue of a violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
117
United States v. Morris, No. 08-0142, 2008 WL 5249231, at *9 (W.D. La. Nov. 14. 2008) (quoting
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991)).
118
No. 08-0142, 2008 WL 5249231, at *9 (W.D. La. Nov. 14. 2008).
119
Id. at *10.
120
Id. at *7, *10.
121
See id. at *9.
115
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magistrate judge wrote:
It is clear that the language found in 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)
(the provision at issue in Touby) is much more specific
and detailed than is the language found in § 16913(d).
Specific guidance and directions is given in § 811(h)
and no such specificity is found in § 16913(d). Both
sections have at their core a “guiding principle”, but
§ 811(h) provides specific guidance to the rule maker
and § 16913(d) does not. Accordingly, if such “specific
guidance” is required when the executive engages in
rule making in the criminal context, I would recommend
that this indictment be dismissed on the ground that
SORNA does not provide sufficient “specific guidance”
so as to allow this delegation of rule making authority to
the Attorney General.122
Supporting the need for closer scrutiny of delegations in the criminal
context, the court in United States v. Aldrich123 similarly expressed
concern, in dicta, that § 16913(d) of SORNA violates the separation of
powers doctrine because it is the product of an improper legislative
delegation to the Attorney General.124 The court noted that determining
to whom SORNA applied and when it applied were legislative functions
and therefore could not be left to the Attorney General’s discretion.125
The court concluded that affording the Attorney General such broad
discretion was not an implementation—rather, he is permitted to
choose who it applies to and when it applies, which is a “legislative
function, not an executive function, and thus is unconstitutional.”126
IV. Why “Specific Guidance” Must Be Required
Many cases demonstrate why the law should demand that the
“specific guidance,” rather than “intelligible principle” standard, be
Id at *10; see also id. (“[T]he issue left unresolved in Touby . . . is, whether § 16913(d), which has
obvious criminal implications, requires more specific guidance be given by Congress than would
be the case for regulations promulgated in a non-criminal context. . . . none of the cases hold that
§ 16913(d) is sufficiently specific so as to ‘pass muster’ even if more specificity is required for
regulations promulgated in the criminal context.”). In Touby, the Court found that the thorough
features of the scheduling process designating illegal drugs “meaningful[ly] constrain[ed]” the
Attorney General’s authority. 500 U.S. at 166–67.
123
No. 8:07CR158, 2008 WL 427483, at *6 n.5 (D. Neb. Feb. 14, 2008) (citations omitted).
124
Id.
125
Id. In noting that Congress was “permitted to obtain assistance from other branches of the
government for purposes of implementing SORNA,” the court expressly stated that Congress
could not allow the Attorney General to legislate the time, scope, and reach of the retroactive
reach. See id.
126
Id.
122
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invoked. In turn, specific guidance should be required when delegations
allow for regulations that contemplate criminal sanctions for two
reasons: because they are more likely to risk individual liberties and
because they more often lead to a deprivation of notice in contravention
of federal due process guarantees.
A. Scenarios Where “Specific Guidance” Rather Than
The “Intelligible Principle” Test Might Be Invoked
The cases below demonstrate that the law should demand a
sufficiently stricter standard of draftsmanship when allowing a policy
agency to promulgate regulations that contemplate criminal sanctions.
Regarding whether, after Touby, a heightened standard should be
applicable to delegations concerning criminal offenses, some courts
have answered in the negative127 while others view the issue as open
but uphold any “delegation [that] is subject to constraints similar to
those found sufficient in Touby.”128 Currently, however, there is no
agreement as to just what constitutes adequate legislative guidelines.129
In the end, the issue boils down to a policy determination. Although
cases are uniform as to the disposition of the “intelligible principle”
test, they express a great deal of doubt and reflect great diversity as to
the less certain areas of ethical usage of that test. Many cases include
statements which belie the seeming consistency in their approach to
the problem.
In United States v. Ward,130 the court focused on the rights of a
criminal defendant rather than the society’s interest in criminal law
enforcement and addressed whether an agency standard that was a part
of a criminal enforcement proceeding was overbroad. The defendant in
that case was charged with willfully violating a general duty clause of
the Occupation Safety and Health Act.131 The court stressed that when
E.g., United States v. Brown, 364 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that even if a
heightened standard exists, it would not apply to National Park Service regulations because
Congress, the court assumed without deciding, criminalized those offenses and fixed the
punishment).
128
E.g., United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that authority granted
to the President “may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with
respect to which a national emergency has been declared”).
129
See generally Megan S. Peterson, Clinical Book-Cooking: United States v. Palazzo and the Dilemma
of Attaching Criminal Liability to Experimental Drug Investigators for Faulty Record-Keeping, 56 Loy. L.
Rev. 311, 329–30 (2010) (addressing the varying methods of determining whether an ambiguous
statute imposed criminal liability on clinical investigators and raising the issue of whether
Congress provided sufficient guidelines to the Food and Drug Administration to allow for the
imposition of criminal sanctions).
130
2001 WL 1160168 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2001).
131
Id. at *1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (2006)) (imposing criminal liability on an employer who
willfully violates a safety regulation pursuant to the Act if the violation results in death of an
employee); 29 C.F.R. § 1910. 119 (2012)).
127
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there are criminal proceedings, the protection of liberty interests, which
is in play in a criminal case, must be more disciplined and cautious
than in a civil case.132 Even if a civil statute is at issue in a criminal
proceeding, the court must make sure that it carries the level of clarity
that is needed in a criminal penalty context.133 The court held that the
regulation was not explicit and that it was the agency’s “responsibility
to promulgate clear and unambiguous regulations.”134 Finally, the court
did “not hesitate to find that strict construction of promulgated rules
and regulations is required when implicated in a criminal case.”135
In United States v. Anvari-Hamedani,136 the court held that the
federal International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)137 and
the executive order promulgated thereunder did not violate the nondelegation doctrine nor due process principles, but acknowledged
that the issue of delegating authority to define criminal conduct is
“complex.”138 In Anvari-Hamedani, the IEEPA granted the President
“broad authority”139 to prohibit transfers of funds and equipment to
countries he found threatened national security.140 Thus, President
Clinton signed an executive order that prohibited United States citizens
from investing in Iran.141 The defendant was charged, in part, with
violating the presidential order issued under the IEEPA and federal
money laundering laws based on alleged transfers of money and
equipment to Iran.142
The defendant constructed the following argument: first, that the
IEEPA presidential directives are the product of an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to the Executive and second, that
the IEEPA and supporting executive orders and regulations are
Id. at *10; see also *7 (“Especially where a regulation subjects a private party to criminal
sanctions, ‘a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but did not
adequately express.’”) (quoting Diamond Roofing Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir.
1976).
133
Id.
134
Id. at *26 (“The test is not what might have been intended by such regulation, but what it
actually says.”)
135
Id. (citing United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 132 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir.1997)); United States v.
Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that when considering
the imposition of criminal sanctions, “a court will not be persuaded by cases urging broad
interpretation of a regulation in the civil-penalty context.”); see also McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[I]n the criminal context, courts have traditionally required greater clarity in
draftsmanship than in civil contexts.”)).
136
378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 827 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
137
50 U.S.C § 1701 et. seq.
138
Id. at 828–29.
139
Id. at 825 n.1.
140
Id. at 827.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 825.
132
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unconstitutionally vague because they fail to provide fair warning of
illegal conduct.143
Regarding the nondelegation claim, the court took the Fourth
Circuit’s lead, which, in turn, adopted the reasoning of Touby to find
the IEEPA’s delegation of authority to criminalize conduct came with
“constraining” factors and “explicitly defined and circumscribed”
presidential powers satisfying the intelligible principle test.144 The
restrictions present in the IEEPA, however, are far more specific
than those—if any are present—in SORNA. With regards to the due
process vagueness argument, the court concluded that even in light of
“investment” being “very broadly” defined, the President’s order gave
fair warning of what conduct is illegal.145
The nondelegation doctrine also played a role in Industrial Union
Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute146 and American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan.147 In those cases, Justice
Rehnquist, concurred and dissented, respectively, because the
majorities failed to hold that section 6(b) of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) violated the nondelegation doctrine.148 Via
SORNA, Congress has done precisely what Justice Rehnquist in
Industrial Union Department., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,149
snubbed.150 In Industrial Union, Justice Rehnquist used the notions of
the nondelegation doctrine to conclude that Congress, alone, must
make the difficult policy decisions rather than pass the responsibility
to an administrative or other government official.151
Id. at 827, 830. Additionally, he contended that in any event, his conduct was permitted
because he was merely sending funds to his family in Iran for humanitarian purposes. Id. at 831.
The court determined that this claim is a “trial defense, not a rationale why the law is vague.” Id.
144
Id. at 829 (citing U.S. v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1093–94 (4th Cir. 1993)) (“The
IEEPA . . . defines the specific circumstances in which the President may act and to what extent.”).
145
Id. at 831.
146
448 U.S. 607 (1980).
147
452 U.S. 490 (1981).
148
Am. Textile, 452 U.S. at 543; Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 672.
149
448 U.S 607 (1980).
150
Id. at 672 (“This litigation presents the Court with what has to be one of the most difficult
issues that could confront a decisionmaker: whether the statistical possibility of future deaths
should ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of preventing those deaths. I would
also suggest that the widely varying positions advanced . . . demonstrate . . . that Congress, the
governmental body best suited and most obligated to make the choice confronting us in this
litigation, has improperly delegated that choice to the Secretary of Labor and, derivatively, to this
Court.”).
151
See id. (stating that Congress, not the executive branch, is the “governmental body best suited
and most obligated to make” hard policy choices); see also id. at 675 (noting that delegations of
legislative powers are permitted so long as Congress establishes “the general policy and standards
that animate the law, leaving the agency to refine those standards, ‘fill in the blanks,’ or apply the
standards to” certain cases).
143
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Likewise, in American Textile,152 Justice Rehnquist vehemently
dissented, stating that Congress “unconstitutionally delegated to
the Executive Branch the authority to make the ‘hard policy choices’
properly the task of the legislature.”153 His argument supports the
inference that there must be a balance between the rights of the
individual and the rights of society. But more importantly, it supports
the notion of Congress’s accountability.154
The lack of consensus among the circuit courts with addressing
whether SORNA supports the notion that applying a blanket “intelligible
principle” test to congressional delegations is unsatisfactory.
As exemplified by the analysis in Ward, there must be a halt to
convicting defendants, whether in the criminal or civil context, under
unconstitutionally overbroad statutes. SORNA is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to pre-Act defendants when literal compliance would
require them to remain in limbo essentially until the Attorney General
directs them to “jump” and then promulgates rules that specify “how
high.”
B. Delegation and Individual Liberties
There is a significant distinction between individual liberties and
property interests.155 The standard of criminal enforcement power is
open-ended and vague, and the range of Congress’s power to invest
the Attorney General with such discretion is almost unchecked.
Admittedly, some discretion is needed to preserve social values and
promote social reform; but, when it comes to how the Department
452 U.S. 490 (1981).
Id. at 543–46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 671 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) (calling for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine when evaluating the legality of
an Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard for benzene)). See generally Sandra B.
Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New
Deal, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 941, 942–43 (asserting that the nondelegation doctrine revealed hostility to
“socially progressive legislation” during the Lochner-era).
154
Compare American Textile, 452 U.S. at 545–46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
statutory words “to the extent feasible” were “so vague and precatory” and that Congress
“passed” on making a choice, resolving a “difficult policy issue,” and speaking with greater
precision to “mask a fundamental policy disagreement” within the Congress) (internal citations
omitted), and United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 922 (5th Cir. 2011) (pointing out that when
SORNA was enacted, Congress “elected not to decide for itself whether SORNA’s registration
requirements—and thus § 2250(a)’s criminal sanctions—would apply” to pre-ACT sex offenders
and instead left it up to the Attorney General to resolve that question), with Reynolds v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 981 (2012) (asserting that Congress must have intended for the Attorney
General to decide § 16913’s applicability because it might “not prove feasible” to immediately
require newly registering or re-registering of a large number of pre-SORNA offenders).
155
Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 Va. L. Rev. 79,
155 (2008) (explaining that notice of a criminal conviction subjects the offender to attitudes of
indignation and public shame and noting that “this expressive element is what distinguishes . . .
mere ‘penalties’ or ‘price tags from true ‘punishment.’”).
152
153
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of Justice wields its discretion to enforce laws of our criminal justice
system, the standard by which we evaluate that enforcement power
must be guided by more than an intelligible principle.
Time and time again the courts fail to recognize the constitutional
issues underlying the nondelegation doctrine and the leniently-read,
ambiguous laws in reference to criminal punishments. The Court has
implied that the same principles are used when evaluating the validity
of a delegation, both in the civil and criminal context and regardless
of the subject matter.156 But, as the deep circuit divide has confirmed,
upholding the intelligible principle standard has led to confusing
conclusions as to whether SORNA provides the Department of Justice
with sufficient standards to guide its actions in such a way that courts
can decipher whether the congressional policy has been followed.
The trend of the majority has been to narrowly interpret delegations
so as to avoid constitutional problems.157 However, a few Justices have
argued that delegations by Congress of power to burden an individual’s
exercise of “fundamental freedoms” must be acutely scrutinized.158
Thus, the courts’ justifications for applying the “intelligible principle”
test loses its bite when considering that ambiguous statute put civil
liberties at stake. There is there is a need for clarity, notice, and caution
and the degree to which Congress must provide the required guidance
in its delegations must be more defined.159 When a statute is used in a

See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 779 (1948) (noting that there is no precise degree to
which Congress must specify its polices and standards for a court to find that the administrative
authority granted was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). See also Modern
Modern Muzzleloading, Inc. V. Magaw, 18 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33–34 (D.D.C. 1998) (concluding that
an agency’s interpretation of a certain criminal statute should be given deference, even when the
interpretation resulted from an administrative adjudication rather than the rulemaking process).
Cf. Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the court will not defer to an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous state if the individual would be penalized without fair notice of
the regulatory violation).
157
See e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 986–87
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989)) (“‘[I]t is our
settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues
if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.’”). But see Richard A.
Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 285 (1985) (“The practical effect of interpreting
statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is . . . to enlarge the . . . reach of constitutional
prohibition beyond even the most extravagant modern interpretations of the Constitution . . .”).
158
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269–70 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). But see id. at
283–86 (White, Harlan, J.J., dissenting).
159
Compare Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 C.F.R. 379, 389 (1936–1938) (authorizing the Secretary of
State to use his discretion in refusing to issue a passport) with Kent, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (snubbing
the Secretary of State’s regulation prohibiting issuing passports to Communist Party members).
In Kent, the court stated, “[w]here the activities of enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the
well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all
delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.” Id. at 129.
156
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criminal case, it must be subject to a certainty160 because “[t]he numerous
deficiencies connected with vague legislative directives whether to a
legislative committee, to an executive officer, to a judge and jury, or to
private persons, are far more serious when liberty and the exercise of
fundamental rights are at stake.”161
Thus, the “intelligible principle” standard does not consider the
fundamental distinction between individual liberties and property
interests. As one scholar notes, “[c]riminal liability carries with it
a powerful stigma, which is painful in and of itself” and criminal
penalties have “the capacity to . . . alter one’s self-perception.”162 In
contrast, “[c]ivil liability and sanctions usually relate to conduct
devoid of, or at least bearing low, moral culpability, and as such, are
untainted by moral condemnation and stigma.”163 Because personal
liberty interests have a different quality than property interests, “even
if civil law could generate deterrence similar to that produced by
criminal law . . . it would not provide the same moral directive that is
associated with criminal law.”164 Thus, the liberty interests, which are
in play in a criminal proceeding, must be more disciplined, cautious,
and protected in a than in a civil case. Procedural barriers regarding
the imposition of criminal liability and the standard of preenforcement
review must be subject to a certainty to avoid having the features of
criminal punishment inflicted erroneously. And, if a civil statute is
referenced in a criminal proceeding, the court must make sure that it
carries the level of clarity that is needed in a criminal statute.
C. Without Congressional Specificity Beyond an
Intelligible Principle, Individuals are Deprived of
Notice of the Criminality of Their Behavior
Elusive and overbroad statutes result in unjust denial of liberty
because they do not give an individual fair warning that certain
conduct will give rise to criminal penalties and invite arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.165 Thus, the “intelligible principle” test
See Robel, 389 U.S. at 275 (1967) (“The area of permissible indefiniteness narrows, however,
when the regulation invokes criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental rights.”).
161
Id. (internal citations omitted).
162
Rosen-Zyi & Fisher, supra note 127 at 94–95.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 94. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and
Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1876, 1884 (1992)
(explaining that what distinguishes civil from criminal law is that the former simply prices public
harms while the latter forbids serious harms to specific victims while playing an educative and
socializing role.).
165
United States v. Ward, 2001 WL 1160168, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2001) (elaborating that the voidfor-vagueness requires that an individual have fair notice “in light of common understanding
within the regulated community” of what conduct is proscribed or required).
160
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applied in Mistretta is not a sufficiently strict standard to apply in cases
that involve ambiguous legislation, wherein Congress authorizes an
agency to issue regulations that contemplate criminal sanctions.166 The
Supreme Court has stated, “a criminal conviction ought not to rest upon
an interpretation reached by the use of policy judgments rather than by
the inexorable command of relevant language.”167 Nonetheless, some
courts have neglected this strict command in evaluating Congress’s
delegation of authority to the Attorney General in § 16913 of SORNA.168
As a result, the validity of the Attorney General’s Interim Rule is
unclear.
Given the stakes of the interests affected by SORNA, there is all
the more reason to notify the public of newly promulgated rules.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)169 provides that notice and
comment170 opportunities ensure “public participation and fairness”
by mandating that an agency give any individual or organization
interested in the proposed rule and opportunity to participate in its
rulemaking via written or oral submission of their opinions.”171 The
APA ensures “that administrative policies affecting individual rights
and obligations be promulgated pursuant to certain stated procedures
so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc
determinations.”172
In promulgating the 2007 Interim Rule, the Attorney General did
not comply with the APA’s notice and comment procedures.173 Instead,
See Dravo Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Heatlth Review Comm’n, 613 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d
Cir. 1980) (championing a strict standard for cases implicating penal sanctions when stating that
“the coverage of an agency regulation should be no broader than what is encompassed within its
terms” when dealing with a penal sanction).
167
M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 626 (1946) (reversing a conviction because the
regulation at issue was vague).
168
See e.g., United States v. Sherman, 784 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (W.D. Va. 2011). As mentioned
previously, the courts of appeals are divided on exactly when SORNA’s registration requirements
became applicable to pre-enactment sex offenders.
169
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006).
170
See id. § 553(b).
171
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F. 2d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
172
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974); see also Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 83 F.3d
165, 169 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that when a statute is drafted in such a way that is “does not
impose a duty on the person subject to it but instead authorizes” or requires an agency to impose
duties by implementing rules, “the formulation of [the] duty becomes a legislative task” and such
rules must be issued through proper rulemaking procedures); see also DIA Navigation Co. v.
Pomeroy, 34 F.3d. 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that courts struggle to distinguish substantive
from interpretive rules, the distinction of which is paramount to understanding the underlying
policies of the APA’s procedural requirements).
173
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006); see also United States v. Valverde, 628 F. 3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir.
2010) (explaining the “three-step process” required under the APA, including notice of the
proposed rule by publication in the Federal Register, a thirty-day period for public comment and
publication of the final rule thirty days before its effective date).
166
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he stated he had “good cause” to promulgate a rule without “notice
and comment.”174 Interestingly, when the Attorney General stated
the good-cause exception applied because the notice and comment
procedure were “contrary to the public interest,”175 he explained that
“[t]he immediate effectiveness of this rule is necessary to eliminate any
possible uncertainty about the applicability of the Act’s requirements”
and to protect the public safety.176 But, some courts have argued that
in criminal cases, “there is all the more reason to strictly adhere to
the requisite rulemaking procedures”177 and this becomes important
with regards to the standard by which the courts should evaluate an
ambiguous statute that affects an individual’s fundamental freedoms.
Conclusion
Through SORNA, Congress uses the courts to screen what it is
doing by puppeteering instead of making straight forward policy
choices in ways that society can see in the legislation. When Congress
creates ambiguous statutes, like section 16913(d), there is little or
no guidance for a pre-SORNA sex offender to know when he has
crossed the invisible line into an area of criminal behavior and thus
may be punished pursuant to section 2250. Section 16913(d) embraces
conduct which is constitutionally protected as well as conduct which
may be prohibited, and there is no line between the two which can
be ascertained with any assurance or precision. For pre-SORNA sex
offenders, the statute does not explicitly provide that violating its very
terms or valid regulations issued pursuant thereto constitutes a crime.
Courts must demand a higher standard of certainty when statutes
delegate agencies with the power to impose criminal sanctions that
affect individual liberties. For the aforementioned reasons, the Supreme
Court should consider adopting a more just rule, one that favors the
rights of individuals and also ensures that the adversary system of
justice is functioning properly by checking that only the guilty are
convicted: Congress must provide more specific guidance to agencies
See 72 Fed. Reg. 8894, 8896–97 (Feb. 28, 2007). The good cause exception provides that an
agency may dispense with the notice and comment requirements if such procedures “are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B); see also id.
§ 553(d)(3)(noting that “for good cause found and published with the rule,” an agency may make
the rule effective immediately instead of waiting thirty days after publication).
175
72 Fed. Reg. at 8897.
176
Id. at 8896–97. On December 29, 2010, the Attorney General proposed a new rule finalizing the
interim rule, which became effective on January 28, 2011. See 75 Fed. Reg. 81, 849 (Dec. 29, 2010);
id. at 91, 850.
177
United States v. Ward, 2001 WL 1160168, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Sept 5, 2001) (citing United States v.
Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); see id. (“We know of no manner in which a rule could
have greater binding effect than in a criminal case such as this, where the interpretation, rather
than the regulation or statute, provides essentially all of the guidance on the existence of a duty.”).
174

Vol. 6.2

Legislation & Policy Brief

321

in crafting regulations that have criminal implications than would be
the case for regulations promulgated in a non-criminal context.

